Tuesday, July 20, 2010

LETTER FROM SENIOR LEGAL OFFICER MS. MC CAHON DATED 16.7.2010 - PARA.3 ISSUE OF COMPLAINT BEING OUTDATED NOT RELEVANT?

Nicholas Ni Kok Chin - LL.B.; B.Econs.(Business & Accountancy), Post. Grad. Dip (Business Law),

Your ref: 197/10

Tuesday, 20 July 2010


Legal Profession Complaints Committee
Post Office Box Z5293
St George’s Terrace
PERTH WA 6831
2nd Floor, Colonial Building Phone: (08) 9461 2299
55 St George’s Terrace Fax: (08) 9461 2265
PERTH WA 6000 Email: lpcc@lpbwa.com
Atten: Senior Legal Officer Ms. G McCahon Website: www.lpbwa.org.au


Dear Sir

COMPLAINT AGAINST DAVID TAYLOR

I refer to your letter to me dated 16th day of July, 2010 to which I wish to respond with 18 attached pages, as follows:

a) As regards paragraph 2, I know they are very serious allegations that I am making against Mr. David Taylor and Registrar Powell but I have no choice because it was not I who started this. I tried to settle it with Mr. Taylor but he had said that I need to do whatever I wanted to do and he denied me justice as a result.
b) It was Mr. Taylor who complained against me first and it was also Registrar Powell who ordered costs against me unjustifiably and I had to fight that at the Midland Magistrates Court with Mr. Maurice Frederick Law, who also admitted to you recently that it was I who removed his Caveats and not Master Sanderson some years later. Mr. Anthony Prime as solicitors for the sister in law of Ms. Nancy Hall one Audrey Frances Hall is trying to claim costs for this non-removal of the Spunter’s caveats and a stop was consequently put to that legal process.
c) Now, I am being denied my legal costs for all my legal work done for my deceased client Ms. Nancy Cloonan Hall and I have been through the High Court and back and the matter has still not been decided yet and so it is still not res judicata, hence my current action in CIV 1877 of 2010.
d) As regards your paragraph 3, I do not see that this matter is over six years old and besides this matter has been in dispute ever since its beginning and it has been the subject of my litigation with the Legal Practice Board which had never been decided yet because the Board is only contented with making the allegations that I have a proclivity in making false allegations. It is therefore necessary for me to prove my case such that I can exercise my right to practice independently as a solicitor again.
e) I have provided you with a lot of evidence in the past and I would like to produce it again in the following forms:
i) My Ex parte Application in my Notice of Originating Motion CIV 1877 of 2010 dated 11th June, 2010 in 3 pages.
ii) My Affidavit in Support of same sworn 9th day of June, 2010 in 3 pages (containing a list of nine annexed documents containing totalling 43 pages) but I am providing you only the relevant annexed pages as indicated below.
iii) Pages 16 and 17 of the Judgment of the Court of Appeal in Chin v Hall [2009} WASCA 216 which is CACV 107 0f 2008 which contains the accidental slip of that judgment in its paragraphs 54 and 55. They relied upon the letter of Registrar Powell dated 11.6.2009 and the justices formulating them were therefore misled by it and they the paragraphs are accidental errors.
iv) Affidavit of David Taylor sworn 29.3.2007 which contradicts the contents of Registrar Powell’s letter dated 11.6.2009: the former stating that both 20cents and $654.00 court fees in the form of a cheque was accepted by the Court Registry on 10.2.2006 when CIV 1131 of 2006 was filed on that day.
v) Paragraph 15 and 16 of David Taylor’s Affidavit stating that the court fees was paid on 10.2.2006 for which receipts were obtained from the Court Registry for the two sums.
vi) DGT 13 is the document attached to Mr. David Taylor’s affidavit which shows that the filing of CIV 1131 of 2006 was filed on 10.2.2006.
vii) DGT14 is the receipt from the Court Registry produced by Mr. David Taylor stating that the two sums of $654.00 in the form of cheque and 20 cents in the form of cash was paid into the Court Registry on 10.2.2006 and receipted by it on the same day. These documents are therefore falsified documents contrary to s.85 of the Criminal Code Act, 1913 WA.
viii) Registrar Powell’s letter dated 11.6.2009 addressed to me stating that the copy of the Writ in CIV 1131 of 2006 that was shown to him stating that the court fees of $654.20 was paid when the Writ was filed on 10.2.2006 in its original assessment No.1 bearing No. 201702 was cancelled on 10.2.2006 because it was short of 20 cents because the 20 cents was not paid on time. This contradicts the earlier evidence of the Registry which indicates that the 20 cents was paid for on time and for which a receipt was issued on time on 10.2.2006. It is preposterous for Registrar Powell to state that there was a separate assessment issued bearing No. 202483 dated 16.2.2010 when the same two amounts were again paid this time with credit card and with cash. If this is not a cover-up, then I cannot think of another term to express it.
ix) The High Court has implicitly stated or has stated in effect in its judgment in P1 of 2010 that the issue of my having removed the Caveats of Spunter Pty Ltd who is the client of Mr. David Taylor through the operation of law by virtue Mr. David Taylor not having complied with Justice Jenkins Order in a timely fashion on 10.2.2006, needs to be caused by my solicitor’s work in CIV 1142 of 2005 and it must not be caused by Master Sanderson having removed them only some years later in CIV 1775 of 2008. Therefore, I am entitled to my just remuneration for my solicitor work from the estate of the late Ms. Nancy Hall.
x) The daughter of the late Ms. Nancy Hall in her Affidavit prepared by her independent solicitor at paragraph 8 says that she believes through best information available to her that David Taylor never commenced CIV1131 of 2006 and hence the reason why I refused to be involved in the subsequent action known by that name that was trying to defraud the court.
xi) I have since written two letters to the Registrar of the Court of Appeal dated 5.7.2010 and another dated most recently, stating the principle of the common law that the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to correct its own accidental slip occasioned by the misleading letter of Registrar Powell dated 11.6.2009. In fact s.33 of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 of WA also provides for the correction of this accidental slip without having to go through the process of an appeal.
xii) Copy of the Writ of Summons in CIv 1131 of 2006 found at page 65 of the Green Appeal Book of CACV 107 of 2008 which is the Court of Appeal judgment referred to in sub-paragraph (iii) above.

If there is any further enquires, pleas do not hesitate to let me know and I might be able to help. Please note that it is never my inclination to cause any one any trouble but the public interests must be upheld at all costs.


Yours faithfully



NICHOLAS N CHIN

Office: 387 Alexander Drive, DIANELLA WA 6059, AUSTRALIA. Contact: ph & fax: +6189275 7440; mobile: 0421642735; emails: nnchin09@tpg.com.au; nnchin@msn.com; Skype: nicholasnchin2885

Thursday, July 15, 2010

SUBMISSIONS FOR GROUNDS OF APPEAL IN CACV75 OF 2008

SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA NO.: CACV: 75 OF 2010
COURT OF APPEAL
In the matter of an Application pursuant to
subs. 60(1)(f)(3) of the Supreme Court Act,
1935 (WA) for leave to appeal the decision
of the Justice Kenneth Martin in CIV 1903
of 2008 heard on 17.6.2010 and delivered on
8.7.2010 granting the First Defendant stay
of the subs.36(4) Magistrates Court Act,
2004 proceedings, subject to the payment of
security for costs of $20.000.00 into court,
thus unjustly stultifying those proceedings
which has already been granted the first
stage of the subs.36(1) Review by Justice
Hasluck.

Ex-parte: NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN
OUTLINE OF WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY APPELLANT
FOR APPELLANT’S GROUNDS OF APPEAL AND LIST OF AUTHORITIES


Date of document: 16th July, 2010
Date of filing: 16th July, 2010.
Filed on behalf of: The Appellant
Prepared by:
Nicholas N Chin Phone & Fax: 08 9275 7440
387, Alexander Drive Email: nnchin@msn.com;
nnchin09@tpg.com.au
DIANELLA WA 6059 Mobile: 0421642735

INDEX PAGE NUMBERS

COURT OF APPEAL 1
Ex-parte: NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN 1
OUTLINE OF WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY APPELLANT 1
FOR APPELLANT’S GROUNDS OF APPEAL AND LIST OF AUTHORITIES 1
Prepared by: 1
BACKGROUND 2
JURISDICTION 2
THE APPEAL 3
GROUNDS OF APPEAL 4
A) NORMAL APPROACH: 4
B) DENIAL OF NATURAL JUSTICE 5
C) CONSOLIDATION 7
D) MC KENZIE FRIEND 10
E) RECUSAL OF SECOND JUDGE 12
E) RE-OPERNS THE FLOODGATE OF LITIGATION: 15
CONCLUSION: 16

BACKGROUND
JURISDICTION
A. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Appeal is provided for in s.58(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 (WA) in these terms:

“applications for a new trial or rehearing of any cause or matter, or to set aside or vary any verdict, finding or judgment found given or made in any cause or matter tried or heard by a judge or before a judge and jury”.

B. The sections of the Act that allows this Appeal are: s. 59(1), (3), (4) and (6) and s.60 (1)(f) & (3) which provide as follows:

59(1) In any cause or matter in which a verdict has been found by a jury, or by a judge without a jury … the Court of Appeal may order a new trial or reference, or vary or set aside such verdict, or reduce the damages awarded.
59(3) A new trial may be ordered as to part only of any matter in controversy or as to some or one only of the parties, or as to any question or issue without disturbing any finding or decision as to any other part of the controversy or any other party, or on any question or issue, and final judgment may be given as to any such other part or party or on any such other question or issue.
59 (4) On the hearing of any such application the Court of Appeal shall have and may exercise all such powers as are exercisable by it upon the hearing of an appeal and may, if it is satisfied that it has before it all the materials necessary for finally determining the question in dispute or any of them, or for awarding any remedy or relief sought, give judgment accordingly, and for that purpose shall have and may exercise all the jurisdiction, powers, and duties of the Court, whether as to amendment or otherwise, and may draw any inference of fact not inconsistent with the findings of the jury, if any, or may, if it is of the opinion that it has not sufficient materials before it to enable it to give judgment, direct the application to stand over for further consideration, and may direct such issues or questions to be tried or determined, and such accounts and inquiries to be taken and made, as it thinks fit, or may direct judgment to be entered in accordance with the finding or determination of any issue or question directed to be tried or determined, or may give judgment, in any of the modes authorised by this Act or the rules of court.
59(6) Except as may be otherwise provided by the rules of court every application —
(i) for a new trial; or
(ii) to set aside a verdict, finding, or judgment,
in any cause or matter where there has been a trial by a judge sitting without a jury, shall be made by way of appeal to a Court of Appeal in accordance with the rules of court.
60 (1) (f)(3): No appeal shall lie to the Court of Appeal — without the leave of the judge or the master of the Court of Appeal, from any interlocutory order or interlocutory judgment made or given by a judge or a master, except in the following cases, namely:….. An application for leave to appeal may be made ex parte, unless the judge or the master or the Court of Appeal otherwise directs.
THE APPEAL
A. This is an Appeal against the Second Judgment of the Second Judge in the second stage of the CIV 1903 OF 2008 S.36 Review Proceedings cited as RE: MICHELIDES; EX PARTE CHIN [No.2] [2010] WASC 169 heard 17.6.2010 delivered on 8.7.2010 for which leave is being sought from a judge of the Court of Appeal under s. 60(1)(f)(3) of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 WA.
B. The Second Judgment is the decision of the second stage or the subs. 36(4) proceedings in CIV 1903 of 2008 in which the Applicant is made the Plaintiff by the Justice Hasluck (the First Judge).
C. The first stage or the subs. 36(1) proceedings in CIV 1903 of 2008 was heard by First Judge who granted his Review Orders on 7.11.2008 in his judgment cited as RE MICHELIDES, EX PARTE CHIN [2008] WASC 256 delivered on 7.11.2008.
D. The Second Judge before his delivery of the Second Judgment had delivered his First judgment cited as THIES V CHIN [2010] WASC 111 heard 13.5.2010 and published on 25.5.2010.
E. The First Judgment has the legal effect of excluding the Appellant from being heard in his own cause in his son’s (Paul Chung Kiong Chin or the Second Defendant in the CIV1903 of 2008) case in the Caveat Case of CIV 1112 of 2007 of which the First Defendant is the Plaintiff and the Paul is the First Defendant.
F. The purpose of this Appeal is to appeal both the First Judgment and the Second Judgment of the Second Judge.

GROUNDS OF APPEAL
A) NORMAL APPROACH:

1. The Second Judge should not have departed from the normal approach as such a departure is proscribed by the common law principle in the case of RE: AN APPLICATION UNDER THE MAGISTRATES COURT ACT, 2004; EX PARTE BRECKER [2007] WASC 151 at para.58 per Beech J who said the following (see page. 6 of the Affidavit of the Appellant in CIV 1981 of 2010 sworn 28.6.2010):
“58 However, I do not accept the respondent’s submission that an applicant for prerogative relief who has demonstrated a jurisdictional error must then satisfy the court that the circumstances call for a favourable exercise of discretion. In my opinion, the position is to the contrary. In the setting of an application for prerogative relief, the discretion may be said to be a discretion to withhold relief, rather than a discretion to grant it. So, for example, in Re Carey; ex parte Exclude Holding Pty Ltd [2006] WASCA 219 at [129]; (2006) 32 WAR 501 at 527, Martin CJ observed (citing Gudgeon v Black ; ex parte Gudgeon (1994) 14 WAR 158 at 178 – 179) that an appropriate starting point in the consideration of the exercise of the discretion to grant prerogative relief is that once it is found that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction the court will normally exercise its discretion in the applicant’s favour. Thus, it will normally be for those opposing the grant of relief to point to factors which justify a departure from that approach.”
1.1.1. Note that it is not for the Appellant to satisfy the Second Judge that the former is calling for the s.36 relief. Rather it is the duty of the First Defendant in the second stage of the s.36 proceedings through his counsel barrister Scott Ellis to satisfy the Second Judge so that the latter would have to withhold that s.36 relief which had already been granted by the First Judge to the Appellant on 7.11.2008.
1.1.2. Since there have been no justifying circumstances to depart from that normal approach, and since the jurisdictional error of the courts below have been proven to the First Judge, the Second Judge is in jurisdictional error because he had departed from that normal approach as proscribed by the common principle of Ex-Parte Brecker in his two interlocutory judgments as described above.
1.1.3. See the explanation for the role of the Second Judge in the subs.36(4) of these proceedings and the reasons why the Second Judge is being deflected from that role in paras.4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 18 and 21 to 29 of the CIV1981 of 2010 Affidavit filed by the Appellant dated 28.6.2010 for the purpose of calling for the recusal of the Second Judge.
1.1.4. There is no where in the transcript of the proceedings before the Second Judge that indicates that the First Defendant in the second stage of the s.36 proceedings has been fulfilling his duty to the court to call upon the Second Judge to withhold the grant of the s.36 relief already given by the First Judge.
1.1.5. See List of transcripts of proceedings before the Second Judge at page 1-3 of the CIV 1981 Affidavit: NNC1- pages 12-27; NNC-2 pages 28 – 47; NNC- pages-48-53; NNC-54-68; NNC-pages 69 to 70a- 73c – 74 and the last transcript dated 8.7.2010. Yet Second Judge at paragraph 28 at page 9 of his Second Judgment said that the Appellant had “limited success” and that “he thought he had successfully obtained final relief”. This shows that the Second Judge is erring on the ground of his apprehended bias in that he has less than the impartiality that is required of him to continue to hear these proceedings; he should therefore recuse himself; the second stage of the s.36 proceedings should therefore be heard de novo by another Judge.
1.1.6. See page 95 to 111 of Annexure NNC12-1 of the CIV1981 Affidavit of the Appellant which contains the Written Submission of the Appellant in relation to Order for Security of Costs filed 24.6.2010.

B) DENIAL OF NATURAL JUSTICE
2.1. Owen J in Ex parte Fealey (1897) 18 NSWLR (L) 282 at 288-289 defines “denial of natural justice” in these terms:

“A decision contrary to natural justice is where the presiding Judge or Magistrate [THE SECOND JUDGE] denies to a litigant[THE APPELLANT] some right or privilege or benefit to which he is entitled in the ordinary course of the proceedings [THE SUBS.36(4) PROCEEDINGS], as for instance where a Magistrate refuses to allow a litigant to address the Court[FOR EXAMPLE: TO BE HEARD IN HIS OWN CAUSE IN THE CAVEAT CASE OR TO CONSOLIDATE THE CAVEAT CASE INTO THESE PROCEEDINGS AND HE REFUSED TO SEE THAT THE AFFIDAVIT OF THE FIRST DEFENDANT IS CONCISE WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF THE NON-CONSENSUALITY OF THE VARIED SOLICITOR COSTS AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE APPELLANT AND HIMSLF], or where he refuses to allow a witness to be cross-examined, or cases of that kind. That conduct is said to be contrary to natural justice, and is a ground for the interference of this Court”[EMPHASIS ADDED].
2.2. The First Defendant as seen in these proceedings is continuing to exploit the vulnerabilities of the Second Defendant Paul C.K. Chin by his various and varied attempts to exclude the Appellant from protecting his own son Paul.
2.3. The First Defendant knew at all material times that the Paul was not his willing client as can be seen from his own Affidavit. See paras: 30 to 35 at page 10 of the CIV 1981 Affidavit.
2.4. See the transcript of proceedings before the First Judge dated 19.8.2008 at the first directions hearing in the subs. 36(1) proceeding, which was provided to Magistrate Michelides on 20.8.2008 and which succeeded in staying his costs orders against the Appellant. This document provides the whole scenario that was before the courts below to the Supreme Court.
2.5. The Appellant terminated the non-existing retainer of the First Defendant on 4.3.2005 under circumstances where there was never any consensual agreement reached between the former and the latter caused by the latter breaching the pre-contractual terms and the overriding clause of the Varied Solicitor Costs Agreement entered into only between the two parties exclusive of Paul because Paul was never the willing party to the Agreement.. See paras. 36 to 39 of the CIV 1981 Affidavit at page 11.
2.6. Despite this, Paul terminated the retainer of the First Defendant on 21.2.2005 when there was never any retainer between Paul and the First Defendant to begin with: See paras. 40 and 41 of the CIV 1981 Affidavit at page 11.
2.7. Appellant never played the public role of solicitor for his son in the purchase of the Centenary Lunch Bar nor in his engaging the services of the First Defendant. He was at all material times the McKenzie friend of his son Paul or the free agent of his son. Yet, for employing the First Defendant as his son’s lawyer, he found himself to be fighting against his son lawyer instead of finding that lawyer working honestly for this son’s interests against the other party to the DC2065 of 2007 dispute. Why is there a need for the First Defendant to be employed by Paul unless the First Defendant is genuinely is advancing the interests of his supposed client Paul or the Appellant instead of the lawyer’s own interests. There should be no dispute about the legal fees for legal services owing to the First Defendant in accordance with the terms of employment that was clearly spelled out between the parties i.e. between the Appellant and the First Defendant. See paras. 42 to 43 of the CIV 1981 Affidavit at page 11 and 12.
2.8. See why the ZERO SUM FALSE DEBT CLAIM in FR417 of 2007 that was initiated by the First Defendant had made use of the Caveat Case as its handmaid or its “gun” of duress. But for that oppressive handmaid, there would be no duress and therefore there would be no “appearance” of the compromise in the Registrar Wilde Consent Judgment. The Second Judge is always stating that there were “unmet fees” for legal services of the First Defendant and this contrary to the evidence that is available before His Honour. Why should this be so if there was only the “appearance” of a compromise and the existence of the pre-contractual terms which had been breached by the First Defendant has never been disputed by the First Defendant? See paras. 19 and 20 of the CIV 1981 Affidavit. Yet His Honour was telling the Appellant as seen in the transcript that the Appellant need not understand his reasoning and has to accept as Gospel Truth his First and Second Judgments.

2.a. See the transcript of proceedings dated 19.8.2008 before the First Judge in 24 pages. This gives the background of the Appellant’s case for review. There was never any dispute about the honest and integrity of the First Judge. There was never any need for any argument and it was all based on logic. There seems to be no logic in what the Second Judge has been doing and is not arguable at all?
2.a.1. See the Summons in Chambers filed by Paul C. K Chin dated 10th May, 2010 again in 60 pages beginning from pages 21 to 80 of the Affidavit of the Appellant sworn and filed 12th day of May, 2010 in these proceedings.
2.a.2. This same document was first filed by Paul in his own name on 8.10.2008 and Paul appeared before Master Sanderson on 1.5.2009 and it was rejected and the unlawful Caveat was not removed.
2.a.3. It was filed by the Appellant as the legal representative of Paul in these proceedings before the Second Judge and it was not accepted because the Second Judge would not allow Paul to be represented by his father.
2.a.4. See transcript of proceedings before the Second Judge dated 13.5.2010 at page 52 of the CIV 1981 Affidavit.
2.a.5. It is indicated in this transcript that Master Sanderson erred by refusing to release the Caveat on 1.5.2009 on the ground that Paul C.K.Chin was not before him but this is not the case because Paul appeared as a litigant in person before the Learned Master. So an injustice has been done here to Paul where there was an obstruction of the due process of court.
2.a.6. As a result the Second Judge delivered the First Judgment by refusing the right of audience to the Appellant as a McKenzie Friend for his son Paul but His Honour was kind enough to remove the unlawful Caveat of the First Defendant on 16.6.2010 without awarding the damages to Paul CK Chin caused by the unlawful Caveat thus denying the Appellant his natural justice. The Appellant checked with the Registrar of Titles subsequently and found that the unlawful Caveat had indeed been removed. Registrar Ellis informed the Appellant on 17.6.2010 that a letter was sent to the Second Judge to this effect and that a copy of it will be dispatched to Paul but this letter has never arrived. The Second Judge will be reviewing this issue of the unlawful Caveat on 5.8.2010 without the Appellant being present contrary to the promise of the First Judge that the Appellant will be able to represent the interests of Paul in these proceedings until its conclusion. This has been stopped by the Second Judge.
2.a.7. See the Written Submissions dated 10.5.2010 by Paul C.K. Chin as Annexure NNC-2 at page 94 to 107 of the Affidavit of Appellant dated 12.5.2010.
2.a.8. See the Written Submissions dated 10.5.2010 by the Appellant as Annexure NNC-1 at pages 82 to 93 of the Affidavit of Appellant dated 12.5.2010.
2.a.9. The Appellant was denied representation of his son as his McKenzie friend contrary to the decision taken by the First Judge as is contained in the transcript of the proceedings in the first stage of these proceedings.
2.b.1. See the Affidavits of the Appellant filed in the first stage of these proceedings that was before the First Judge in these proceedings dated the 24.7.2008 in 267 pages, 29.8.2008 in 98 pages, 18.9.2008 in 37 pages.
2.b.2. See the Affidavits of the Appellant filed in the second stage of these proceedings dated 12.5.2010 in 140 pages and in CIV 1981 of 2010 calling for the Second Judge’s recusal dated 28.6.2010 that is scheduled to be hard on 4.8.2010 at not before 11.00 am containing 127 pages.

C) CONSOLIDATION
3.1.1. There is no basis for the refusal of the Second Judge to refuse to consolidate the Caveat Case into the current proceedings so that they can be dealt with efficaciously because there is only one transaction or event; they revolves around the Zero sum debt claim with its handmaid of extortion, the Caveat case.
3.1.2. The consolidation of these two actions CIV 1903 of 2008 and CIV 1112 of 2007 is being pursued pursuant to Order 83 of the RSC which has the force of law.
3.1.3. Furthermore, the caveat is unlawful as the First Defendant had no caveatable interest in the home property of the Paul or the Caveat Property at No.29, O’Dell Street, Thornlie, in terms of s.137 of the Transfer of Land Act, 1893 which must confer on him an equitable interests before he can have that caveatable interest . . .
3.1.4. There is no law that can stop the Second Judge from consolidating the Caveat Case into these proceedings or to prevent the joinder of the Appellant to the Caveat Case.
3.1.5. There is also no logical explanation in law that enabled the Second Judge to order that the Appellant pay security costs into court for the purpose of stifling these proceedings.
3.1.6. See the outline of submissions by both the Appellant and his son in these proceedings and the in the Caveat Case filed 10.5.2010 from pages 82 to 107 of the CIV 1981 Affidavit of the Appellant filed 12.5.2010 in these proceedings.
3.1.7. Why should the consolidation of the two cases be avoided unless the aim is to prevent the grounding of liability against the First Defendant for statutory damages under s.140 of the Transfer of Land Act, 1893 (WA).
3.1.8. There are many reasons why the sum of $11,500.00 paid by both the Appellant and his son Paul Chin to the First Defendant constitutes extortion money.
3.1.9. Registrar Wilde knew it to be extortion money and hence the reason why she delayed her delivering of that duress-vitiated Consent Order from 12.4.2007 until 7.6.2007.
3.1.10. The receipt of the extortion money is therefore a criminal offense contrary to subs.391(3) and s.397 and of the Criminal Code Act, 1913 (WA) with circumstances of aggravation:
397. Demanding property with threats with intent to extort or gain
Any person who, with intent to extort or gain anything from any person, —
Knowing the contents of the writing, causes any person to receive any writing
demanding anything from, or that anything be procured to be done or omitted to be done by any person, without reasonable cause, and containing threats of any injury or detriment of any kind to be caused to any person, either by the offender or any other person, if the demand is not complied with; or Orally demands anything from, or that anything be procured to be done or omitted to be done by, any person, without reasonable cause, with threats of any injury or detriment of any kind to be caused to any person, either by the offender or any other person, if the demand is not complied with, is guilty of a crime, and is liable to imprisonment for 14 years.
Alternative offence: s. 338A or 338B.
The term writing includes any gramophone record, wire, tape, or other thing by
Which words or sounds are recorded and from which they are capable of being
reproduced.
3.2. The elements of the crime of demanding property with intent to extort and gain with aggravation, as indicated above are as follows:
3.2.1. Mr. Thies has an intention to extort or gain the $11,500.00 from the Appellant and his son, Paul.
3.2.2. Mr. Thies knows the contents of his writings in the Caveat Case and the False Debt Claim in FR417 of 2007 are a demand for monies from the Appellant and his son Paul without a reasonable cause because there was no debt then owing to him.
3.2.3. Mr. Thies caused his writings to be received by the Appellant and his son Paul.
3.2.4. Mr. Thies knows that his writings contain threats of injury to the Appellant’s son to be landed in hospital as he had caused this on a previous occasion.
3.2.5. Mr. Thies knows that his writing will cause the physical injury to the Appellant’s if his demands to pay him monies for no legal services are not being complied with by the Appellant and his son Paul.
3.2.6. Mr. Thies knows that the person who had the capacity to make the decision to yield to his demand is the Appellant and he is more than sixty years at the time of that demand, hence the circumstances of aggravation..
3.3. Para. 30 of the Second Judgment of the Second Judge states that the First Respondent received clear funds of $11,500 from the Appellant and the Second Respondent in the Sum of $11,500.00 on 18.4.2010 under circumstances that he knows that there was then no consent judgment issued by Registrar Wilde, which was issued belatedly only on 7.6.2007 when the situation became unbearable and the Appellant had to demand for that consent judgment to be issued by an unwilling court to avert the calamity.
3.4. Registrar Wilde was involuntary when she gave in to the demand of the Appellant as she knew that the wills of the both the Appellant and the Second Respondent have been deflected by duress. In fact the will of Registrar Wilde herself had also been deflected as she was also subjected to duress.
3.5. Having regard to the above circumstances, the Second Judge erred when he said at para.31 of the Second Judgment that the First Defendant explained circumstances at 21.6.2007 (this letter was written by the First Defendant in 2007 and in 2009) indicating “that Mr. Chin was seeking to resile from the terms of the settlement deed..” There is no truth in this explanation as it was Mr. Thies recalcitrance to refuse to release the Caveat after had received the “compromise” money.
3.6. The Second Judge at para.32 erred by stating that “ in order to proceed further, that it must be directed some proper procedural or jurisdictional error out of the decisions of the two magistrates,”. His Honour knows that the two magistrates in the court below did not make decisional errors based on merits but they lacked the necessary authority to make those jurisdictional errors i.e. by taking irrelevant considerations in account and not taking relevant considerations in account and by denying the Appellant’s natural justice. These are jurisdictional errors, plain and simple. This is very plain and it is a sad state of affairs….
3.7. The Second Judge has read the contents of the Appellant’s Affidavit filed in CIV 1903 of 2008 sworn 18.9.2008 of 37 pages with annexures. These documents would make it clear that those costs orders by the two magistrates cannot be enforceable under any circumstances. These documents would have eliminated any doubt that the two magistrates have indeed made jurisdictional errors and not errors based on the merits of the cases before them.
3.8. See also the extract of the transcript of these proceedings before the First Judge from pages 121 to 127 of the CIV 1981 Affidavit to see that the First Judge understands the implications of the Minor Cases Provisions and the costs implications is also another basis of the jurisdictional errors of the courts costs orders below which renders them unenforceable.
3.9. The Second Judge erred by failing to understand these costs implications under circumstances when the First Judge did.
3.10. On 8.7.2010 the Second Judge is in jurisdictional error again when he ordered the Appellant to pay the costs of the Security Costs Order to the First Defendant by no complying with the legislative intention of Parliament when enacting the Minor Cases Provisions of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act, 2004.
3.11. See para.36 and 40 of the Second Judge’s judgment in his Second Judgment. This is not the case of having the opportunity to hear the other side as there are many red herrings introduced by the Affidavit of the First Defendant filed 7.10.2009.
3.12. There is only one issue: the non-consensuality of the Varied Solicitor Costs Agreement, not between Paul and This but between Appellant and Thies that was abrogated by the conduct of Mr. Thies himself. There is therefore no entitlement to the proposed legal fees that the First Defendant was improperly demanding from the Appellant or his son Paul. So there is a crime of extortion.
D) MC KENZIE FRIEND
4. A McKenzie friend :
“assists a litigant in person in a common law court. This person does not need to be legally qualified. The crucial point is that litigants in person are entitled to have assistance, lay or professional, unless there are exceptional circumstances. Their role was set out most clearly in the eponymous 1970 case McKenzie v. McKenzie. McKenzie v. McKenzie [1971] P 33; [1970] 3 WLR 472; [1970] 3 All ER 1034, CA.[1] This role applies in the jurisdiction of England and Wales, it is regarded as having its origins in common law and hence has been adopted in practice in other common law jurisdictions such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the Republic of Ireland, and the USA”.
4.1. See pages 63 to 79 of the CIV 1903 Affidavit of the Appellant filed 12.5.2010 which contains the transcript of proceedings before the First Judge dated 17.6.2008. The terms and conditions for the joinder of Paul C K Chin were decided unanimously there by the disputing parties.
4.2. That transcript contains evidence as to the intention of the First Judge to allow the Appellant to represent his son in these proceedings until it reaches its finality and that such representation not to be delimited by the mediation process. There is no mistake here although that the Orders also refer to the mediation process for such representation by the father for the son.
4.3. But the First Judge did not anticipate the mediation to take place anyway and was keen on ensuring that the First Defendant do not bring red herrings into his Affidavit which was not filed in time but only on 7.10.2009.
4.4. The First Judge identified the issues for the First Defendant and request for his Affidavit to be short and concise.
4.5. The purpose of this exercise before the First Judge is for the Appellant to ensure that his son Paul C. K. Chin does not become active in these proceedings thereby not becoming liable for any costs consequences, to the extent that he should not know about the progress of these proceedings such that he does not distress himself unnecessarily to avoid any calamity to him.
4.6. This is to avoid the continuing harm which the First Respondent had been hitherto causing the Second Defendant or Paul C.K.Chin.
4.7. See also page 115 of the CIV 1981 Affidavit where the Appellant explains to the LPCC that he has the mandate from the First Judge to represent his son in these proceedings which includes the Caveat Case and this is the rightful belief of the Appellant in the manner it was negotiated.
4.8. The Second Judge is in error when he said at para. 21 of his Second Judgment that the First Judge did not grant the Appellant general leave to represent his son in the Caveat Case but only in the s.36 proceedings but it is common sense that the latter case is inclusive of the former case which is these proceedings.
4.9. The s.36 Review Process in CIV 1903 of 2008 consolidated the FR944 of 2007 and the FR417 of 2007 or the ZERO SUM FALSE DEBT CLAIM into the subs. 36(1) proceedings before Justice Hasluck.
4.10. The First Defendant applied for the Second Defendant Paul C.K. Chin to be joined into these proceedings and this was agreed to by all the parties before the First Judge with the proviso that Paul be not active. Therefore Paul interests in the Caveat Case must be taken care of by his father as his McKenzie friend.
4.11. The Second Judge in the subs. 36(4) proceedings now refused the Caveat Case to be consolidated into these proceedings for no apparent reason.
4.12. The First Defendant had thought of the expedient of his using the Caveat Case as his gun of duress so that he could escalate the ever-mounting imaginary solicitor’s costs for no legal services performed and hence the reason why the Caveat Case is included in these proceedings.
4.13. The Second Judge misconceived that the First Defendant had a caveatable interests when he did not. See: para.18 of the CIV 1918 Affidavit.
4.14. The Second Judge is reasonably apprehended to be biased in favour of the First Defendant and against the Appellant. See: paras.6 and 8 of the CIV 1981 Affidavit.
4.15. Appellant was not allowed to be joined as Second Defendant in the Caveat Case in CIV 1112 of 2007: See paragraph 9, 10, 15, 16 & 17 of the CIV 1981 Affidavit at pages 5 and 7.
4.16. Transcript in NNC1 referred to above, dated 30.4.2010 portrays the Second Judge’s refusal of the Appellant’s natural justice to hear him in his own cause in the CIV 1112 of 2007 or caveat case, and this is a jurisdictional error on his part, on the grounds:
4.16.1. Second Defendant Paul was never a willing party to the client solicitor relationship with the First Defendant.
4.16.2. There was no consensus ad idem between the Appellant and the First Defendant for the solicitor-client agreement as the latter had breached it fundamental terms.
4.16.3. Transcript in NNC3 dated 17.6.2010 referred to above, where again the Second Judge denied the Appellant his natural justice to appear in his own cause. His Honour incorrectly cited a conflict of interests which is non-existent as the Appellant never played the public role of a solicitor for his son.
4.16.4. The parties have agreed before the First Judge that the Second Defendant Paul is to remain inactive and that his case is to be represented by his father the Appellant, albeit not as a solicitor but as a McKenzie friend and on a pro-bono basis.
4.16.5. Transcript in NNC4 dated 13.5.2010 referred to above, the Appellant refers to the ZERO DEBT FALSE CLAIM of the First Respondent in FR417 of 2007 at pages 55 & 56 which led to the Duress-Vitiated Registrar Wilde Consent Judgment delivered involuntarily by Registrar Wilde on 7.6.2007.
4.16.6. At page 56 of the transcript, there was a reference by the Appellant to the non-compliance of the filing of the show cause affidavit by the First Defendant within the time constraints imposed by the First Judge and yet there was no reasonable explanation for its delay.
4.16.7. At page 64, the argument was made about the legislative intent of parliament in enacting the Minor Cases Provisions of the MCCP.
4.16.8. At page 67, the Appellant argues that the First Respondent has admitted that there as no debt ever owing to him. The Second Judge refused to accept this point.
E) RECUSAL OF SECOND JUDGE
5.1. Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 at [11], affirmed in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; see also Slavin v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 16857 [2006] NSWCA 71:

”The test for determining whether a judge should disqualify himself or herself by reason of apprehended bias is “whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide”:
5.2. See the Affidavit of the Appellant filed in CIV 1981 of 2010 calling for the recusal of the Second Judge dated 28.6.2010 containing 127 pages.
5.3. West’s Process Engineering Pty Ltd (Administrator Appointed) (ACN 002 498 142) & Ors v Westralian Sands Ltd (ACN 008 675 016) & Ors [1998] WASC 108 (15 April 1998) per White J at para.2 – question of whether the court could exercise its discretion to Order for Security of Costs.
5.4. Reference made by White J to the case of MA Productions Pty Ltd v Austarama Television Pty Ltd [1982] 1 ACLC 404, where court listed some matters which go to the proper exercise of proper discretions:

5.3.1. The strength and bona fides of the Plaintiff’s case as attested to by the First Judge.
5.3.2. Whether the opposite party is being oppressive to deny the impecunious his right to litigate;
5.3.3. No money was owing to the First Defendant or there is Zero Sum False debt being claimed by the First Defendant.
5.3.4. The security of costs order is stultifying the Appellant’s action that was confirmed by the First Judge in the s.36 proceedings to have a strong case as opposed to the Second Judge’s view that it is an inherently weak case.

5.5. White J further quoted the case of Cowell v Taylor (1885) 31 Ch D 34 - Court of Appeal held that there is a general rule that the Court does not require security for costs to be given by a plaintiff … even where he is in insolvent circumstances. Bagallay LJ said, at 37:
“But the rule is that any one may sue without giving security, in any but certain excepted cases. Until lately, security was never required in Chancery unless the plaintiff was abroad, and if there were two co-plaintiffs, one of whom only was abroad, security was not ordered.”
5.6.1. The Second Judge erred by not noting that the First Defendant in his Affidavit sworn 7.10.2009 admitted to the following evidence which shows that if he breached them consistently, he has repudiated the fundamental terms of the Varied Solicitor Client Agreement dated 3.11.2004 in the following terms:

5.6.1.1. The pre-contractual terms of the email correspondence between the Appellant and the First Defendant dated 25.10.2007;
5.6.1.2. The overriding clause to the Solicitor Costs Agreement dated 3.11.2004 signed by the First Respondent stating that the Appellant shall approve all billing/costing;
5.6.1.3. The disputed debt for legal services if any is limited to $3,500.00;

5.6.2. Even if First Respondent wins the case, there is the Minor Case Provisions of the subs. 25(1) and Subs. 25(9) and the allowable costs in subs.31(1) of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act, 2004.
5.6.3. The costs claimable by the winner would be limited to out of pocket expenses or for filing fees reasonably incurred by him which was guaranteed by Appellant to the Court.
5.6.4. Refer to transcript of proceedings for both cases CIV 1903 of 2008 and CIV 1112 of 2007 heard before the Second Judge on 30.4.2010 and second directions hearing on 13.5.2010.
5.7 Dawson J, in Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; (1986) 161 CLR 342 (30 July 1986) at para.2 said the following:
“See Kanda v. Government of Malaya (1962) AC 322, at p 337. It is the latter possibility which is important in this case because it is not suggested that the parties did not, in the events which transpired, have an opportunity to be heard. What is suggested by the husband is that he is reasonably entitled to entertain an apprehension of lack of impartiality on the part of the judge. If that is so, then it is enough to vitiate the proceedings because it is established that a judge ought not to hear a case if in all the circumstances the parties or the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that he or she might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the questions involved in it: Livesey v. New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; (1983) 151 CLR 288, at pp 293-294”

5.8. The Second Judge erred when His Honour said that the Appellant had a conflict of interests even if when the Appellant had applied for a practice certificate which he had not. The Appellant can still have his name as a barrister and solicitor because he is what he is irrespective of whether he was practicing law or not. There is a conflict of interests if:
5.8.1. The Appellant owe separate duties to act in the best interests of his son Paul Chin and at the same time if he were practicing law and this happened if he were to be paid by his son Paul for his legal services rendered to his son.
5.8.2. But to have a conflict of interests in relation to the First Defendant he must have agreed to act for the First Defendant in his best interests in relation to the same or related matters and the First Defendant must have paid the Appellant his legal fees.
5.8.3. Then only under such circumstance can the Appellant be said to have been acting in conflict of duties or those separate duties of the Appellant are conflict with each other, or there is a significant risk that those duties of the Appellant may be in conflict with each other; or
5.8.4. The Appellant’s duty to act in the best interests of his son Paul as His Mc Kenzie friend does not conflict with the interests of the First Defendant at all material times, or is there a significant risk that they may conflict, with the First Defendant’s interests in relation to the Review Order Case or the Caveat Case.
5.8.5. But the Appellant or if it is indeed the case, Paul C.K. Chin have been Mr. the First Defedant’s clients (which is not the case) or both of them have been his former clients and the First Defendant owes them a duty to work in their best interests and not to mislead this Honourable Court or to tell the truth to this Honourable Court and in order to do so, the First Defendant must be protecting his own interests in relation to Paul’s interests; therefore the First Defendant must he must not to be reasonably found to be pillaging and plundering Paul or to harass him or to harm him any further.
5.8.6. If the Appellant had not applied for a practice certificate and the Appellant is still not a judge (because he as an officer of the court is a member of the court in which he is participating in) in both the Review Order Case and the Caveat Case as the Appellant is not playing the public role of a solicitor for Paul Chin, and the Appellant does not owe a duty to the public to be fair, but the Appellant still wants to be fair to the First Defendant when he is pursuing justice for both himself and for his son’s own interests.
5.8.7. As long as the Appellant did his work on a pro-bono basis as a McKenzie friend for his son Paul in his Caveat Case, the Appellant cannot be faulted for practicing as a lawyer without a practice certificate.

5.8.8. The Australian government must take steps to ensure that ordinary people who are the mercy of our judicial system which are being misled by erring lawyers are not being tortured against “—UN Convention Against Torture. On December 10, 1948 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Article 5 states:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment orpunishment.” Since that time a number of other international treaties have been adopted to prevent the use of torture. Two of these are the United Nations Convention against Torture and for international conflicts the Geneva Conventions III and IV.

5.8.9. The Government of Western Australia is obliged to take steps to prevent this unlawful torture as provided by Article II. Article II of the United Nations Convention Against Torture provides:
5.8.1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.
5.8.2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.
5.8.3. An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a justification of torture.”

5.9.1. This Honourable Court must divest the Appellant’s personality as a solicitor serving the interests of a member of a public who happens to chose the Appellant as his or her solicitor from that of a natural father who unlike most others, happens to be possessed of a legal mind. The father can be working for a member of the public to earn his living or he can be working on a pro bono basis for his own son to protect his own or his son’s interest or their mutual interests, which invariably merge or coincide to form some collective interests belonging together to both the father and son but mutually divestible from each other, in the legal sense.
5.9.2. The only criteria for the concept of conflict of interests to exist is to prevent the father from becoming impartial in the execution of his duties as an officer of the court when advocating for his son. Here, he is advocating for his own interests and hence that supposed conflict of interests is non-existent.
5.9.3. See pages 46 and 47 of the transcript of the proceedings in the Review Order Case on 17.6.2009 before Justice Hasluck, the Plaintiff and the Respondent together with the latter’s counsel barrister Scott Ellis.

E) RE-OPERNS THE FLOODGATE OF LITIGATION:
6. The Second Judge is proposing to re-open the flood-gates of litigation by ordering that the First Defendant is granted the liberty to apply to vary Order 5 of the First Judge Order so that the Null Costs Orders of the courts below can be re-opened.
6.1. The Second Judge therefore opens up his motives for ordering the Security of Costs against the Appellant purportedly to stifle these prosecutions and His Honour is therefore seen to be favouring and advantaging the First Defendant. This is a travesty of justice and common sense.

CONCLUSION:
7.1. There is only one version to the truth. Either the First Defendant is on the correct side of law or the Appellant is.
7.2. The truth can only be ascertained from the fact whether the First Defendant has a bona fide belief that he an entitlement to the legal fees for the work he has done for the Appellant.
7.3. Whether or no he has that entitlement stems from whether or not there is a CONSENSUAL VARIED SOLICITORS COSTS AGREEMENT ENTERED into between the two parties.
7.4. The fact that there is a Varied Solicitor Costs Agreement entered into between the two parties is without doubt.
7.5. The issue is whether the parties to that VARIED SOLICITOR COST AGREEMENT
confined to the First Defendant and the Appellant had breached the FUNDAMENTAL TERMS of that Agreement:
7.6.1. There is no dispute that the conduct of the First Defendant is irrevocably clear that that he had repudiated the FUNDAMENTAL. TERMS of that Agreement.
7.6.2. The issue is now whether the Appellant had acted upon the repudiating conduct of the First Defendant.
7.6.3. The conclusion of this court is inevitable: the Appellant had ELECTED to accept the repudiating conduct of the First Defendant and to sue him for DAMAGES.
7.6.4. The Appellant HUMBLY SAYS that the only solution left for this Honourable Court is to assess the damages payable by the First Defendant to the Appellant and his son, Paul.


Signed by: ………………………………… ….


LIST OF AUTHORITIES

Websites:

1. Wikipedia Website for the definition of McKenzie Friend at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McKenzie_friend
2. Blogspot of Nicholas N Chin for information of legal documents filed with the
3. Supreme Court of WA regarding my current proceedings at: http://nicholasnchin.blogspot.com/ and http://www.nicholasnchin.com/
4. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_General_Assembly
5. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geneva_Conventions
6. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Declaration_of_Human_Rights
7. For the meaning of Caveatable interests in the article by S.Boyle: Caveatable Interests, Common Lore Distinguished: http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v1n1/boyle11.html;


STATUTES

1. The Supreme Court Act, 1935 WA: Subs. 60(1)(f)(3); 58(1)(a); 59(1), (3), (4) and (6);
2. The Magistrates Court Act, 2004: Subs. 36(1); Subs.36(4).
3. The Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act, 2004: subs.25(9) and 31(1).
4. The Transfer of Land Act, 1893 WA ss. 137, 140.
5. The Criminal Code Act, 1913 WA subs. 391(3); s.397.
6. The Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Bill, 2003: EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
Clause 25(5)
Subclause (5) ensures that where a matter that is within the minor cases jurisdiction is commenced in the general jurisdiction the costs that can be awarded are the very limited costs that would be allowed had the action been commenced in the minor cases jurisdiction. The intention is to ensure that a defendant in a case that could have been commenced in the small cases jurisdiction is not thereby disadvantaged.
Subclause (8) is derived from the Litigants In Person (Costs and Expenses) Act 1975 (UK) and allows a person who represents themselves to recover any expenses or losses incurred if they are successful in recovering costs.
Subclause (9) is effectively a penalty clause and relieves a person from some or `all of costs if the lawyer involved has improperly incurred them or wasted them due to misconduct or default. The lawyer can also be required to make payments to the party if that party is liable to another party due to the actions or omissions of the lawyer. Under subclause (10) a Court cannot make an order under subclause (9) unless it has informed the lawyer and allowed the lawyer to call evidence and make submission in relation to the proposed order. Subclause (11) provides that if an order is made under proposed subsection (9)(c) disentitling a lawyer to costs, the lawyer must not charge and cannot recover the costs concerned.
Clause 31 – Costs
It is the intention of the Bill to keep costs payable in relation to minor cases to a
minimum. Subclause (1) defines “allowable costs” for the purposes of this proposed
section to mean court fees and service fees and the costs of enforcing a judgment.
Subclause (2) provides that the successful party in a minor case is entitled to an order in
relation to their allowable costs but not in relation to the other party’s costs though under
subclause (3) the Court can make an order in relation to the other party’s costs if satisfied
that it is reasonable to make such an order.


CASE LAW:
1. RE: MICHELIDES; EX PARTE CHIN [No.2] [2010] WASC 169
2. RE MICHELIDES, EX PARTE CHIN [2008] WASC 256;
3. THIES V CHIN [2010] WASC 111;
4. RE: AN APPLICATION UNDER THE MAGISTRATES COURT ACT, 2004; EX PARTE BRECKER [2007] WASC 151 at para.58 per Beech J
5. Re Carey; ex parte Exclude Holding Pty Ltd [2006] WASCA 219 at [129]; (2006) 32 WAR 501 at 527, Martin CJ observed (citing Gudgeon v Black ; ex parte Gudgeon (1994) 14 WAR 158 at 178 – 179);
6. Ex parte Fealey (1897) 18 NSWLR (L) 282 at 288-289;
7. Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 at [11], affirmed in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337;
8. Slavin v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 16857 [2006] NSWCA 71:
9. Re JRL; Ex parte CJL [1986] HCA 39; (1986) 161 CLR 342 (30 July 1986);
10. Kanda v. Government of Malaya (1962) AC 322, at p 337;
11. Livesey v. New South Wales Bar Association [1983] HCA 17; (1983) 151 CLR 288, at pp 293-294;
12. DIAGNOSTIC MEDLAB LTD V AUCKLAND DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD, WAITEMATA DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD, COUNTIES-MANUKAU DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD AND ORS HC AK CIV 2006-404-4724 [2007] NZHC 177 (20 March 2007) at paragraphs: 122 and 123 per Asher J.
13. Surfers Paradise Coaches P/L v TSU Chan Lin [2007] NSWSC 475;
FOOTNOTES:
See the judgment of Asher J in the case of: DIAGNOSTIC MEDLAB LTD V AUCKLAND DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD, WAITEMATA DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD, COUNTIES-MANUKAU DISTRICT HEALTH BOARD AND ORS HC AK CIV 2006-404-4724 [2007] NZHC 177 (20 March 2007) at paragraphs: 122 and 123 as indicted below:
[122] A conflict of interest arises when a person carries out a particular function with two or more interests in conflict. In administrative law, a conflict of interest exists when a person has a private interest in a decision where that person also has a public role. In such a case the person's public role and private interest are in conflict. The result can be a poor decision because private concerns that have nothing to do with the public duty have influenced the decision.
[123] The concept of a conflict of interest is well known in the common law. It has developed particularly in the context of professional and fiduciary duties, the classic example being a solicitor's duty not to be in a conflict of interest with a client. It is also well understood in public law where its usual expression is under the heading of bias or apparent bias.

Boyle, S in her article in the Murdoch Law School Electronic Journal found at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v1n1/boyle11.html entitled: CAVEATABLE INTERESTS - THE COMMON LORE DISTINGUISHED said at para.1 that:
“proprietary interest in land will always be sufficient to found a caveatable interest, but a proprietary interest is not necessary for the establishment of a caveatable interest. Consequently, an equitable interest of the sort often dismissed as in the nature of a claim in personam, a mere personal right, is a caveatable interest”.
At para.2 of that article, she further identified four categories of caveatable interests in relation to s.137 of the Transfer of Land Act, 1893 (WA) in the following terms:
“The section identifies four categories of caveatable interests. They are:
(a) any estate or interest in land under the operation of this Act;
(b) any estate or interest under any:
i) unregistered instrument;
ii) document; or
iii) writing
in any lease mortgage or charge;
(c) any estate or interest in any equitable mortgage or charge by a deposit without writing; and
(d) any estate or interest which arises
i) by devolution in law; or
ii) otherwise.”
If Mr. Thies did not have a caveatable interest in the Caveat property, he has no legal basis for his caveat and it must be ordered to be removed together with the concomitant damages as quantified to be made good by him. He can only have the caveatable interest if he has an equitable mortgage or charge over that Caveat property. The only way for him to get an equitable charge or equitable charge over that Caveat Property is for him to enter into a costs agreement with the name of the Caveat property specifically identified in that agreement, failing which he can never be said to have an equitable charge or an equitable mortgage. The law is clear on this point. See the case of: Surfers Paradise Coaches P/L v TSU Chan Lin [2007] NSWSC 475.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McKenzie_friend

GROUNDS OF APPEAL IN CACV 75 OF 2010

SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA NO.: CACV: 75 OF 2010
COURT OF APPEAL
In the matter of an Application pursuant to subs. 60(1)(f)(3) of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 (WA) for leave to appeal the decision of the Justice Kenneth Martin in CIV 1903 of 2008 heard on 17.6.2010 and delivered on 8.7.2010 granting the First Defendant stay of the subs.36(4) Magistrates Court Act, 2004 proceedings, subject to the payment of security for costs of $20.000.00 into court, thus unjustly stultifying those proceedings which has already been granted the first stage of the subs.36(1) Review by Justice Hasluck.

Ex-parte: NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GROUNDS OF APPEAL


Date of document: 18th July, 2010
Date of filing: 18th July, 2010.
Filed on behalf of: The Applicant
Prepared by:
Nicholas N Chin Phone: 08 9275 7440
Litigant in person Fax: 08 92757440
387, Alexander Drive Email: nnchin@msn.com;nnchin09@tpg.com.au
DIANELLA WA 6059 Mobile: 0421642735

INDEX OF HEADINGS PAGE NUMBERS
GROUNDS OF APPEAL 1
BACKGROUND: 1
THE APPEAL: 2
GROUNDS OF APPEAL: 2
A) NORMAL APPROACH 2
B) DENIAL OF NATURAL JUSTICE 2
C) CONSOLIDATION 3
D) MC KENZIE FRIEND 4
E) RECUSAL OF SECOND JUDGE 4
E) RE-OPENS THE FLOODGATE OF LITIGATION 4

BACKGROUND:

The Appellant appeals to the Court of Appeal pursuant to subs. 58(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Act, 1935 for its exercise of its jurisdiction:
a) To grant leave to appeal of the interlocutory decision of Justice Kenneth Martin as the Second Judge in these review proceedings, dated 8.7.2010 made pursuant to subs.36(4) of the Magistrates Court Act, 2004; that leave relates specifically to the Second Judge having granted in error the First Respondent’s Application for Security of Costs under un-justifying circumstances;
b) The first part of these proceedings, already disposed of by the First Judge, Justice Hasluck’s decision, made pursuant to subs. 36(1) of the Act. Since the First Judge had already granted the Review Orders at the first stage of these proceedings, it is now for the Second Judge to adopt the normal approach as recommended by the Ex-parte Brecker principle. However, the course of justice had been deflected by the Second Judge who had followed a less than the normal approach;
c) The Second Judge’s deflection from the normal course of justice had instead dealt a death blow to the continuation of these proceedings by his error in the grant of the Security Costs Order Gag on 8.7.2010 for which the Appellant is seeking to appeal by way of a re-trial of the second-stage process of these proceedings so as to stop the unlawful and illegitimate stifling of these proceedings in the public interests such that a lawyer cannot be seen to be advancing his own interests instead of the interests of his own client through the expediency of making a zero sum debt claim against his client with impunity.

THE APPEAL:

The Appellant now appeals the second stage of these proceedings be abrogated and a re
hearing of the second stage of these proceedings be instituted by a new judge by reason of the fact
that the Second Judge had erred on the following grounds:

GROUNDS OF APPEAL:

A) NORMAL APPROACH
1. In mixed fact and law through contradicting the First Judge’s Review Orders by departing from the normal approach without identifying any justifiable circumstances for doing so.
B) DENIAL OF NATURAL JUSTICE
2. In mixed fact and law by refusing and denying the Appellant his natural justice to be heard in his own cause in the associated case of the Caveat Case of CIV1112 of 2007 of his son (the Caveat Case) having regard to the following facts:
a. The Caveat Case was used by the First Respondent as his handmaid of duress in advancing his zero sum debt FR417 of 2007 claim for the purpose of achieving what he termed to be a real compromise but what was achieved in reality is only the “appearance” of a compromise in Registrar’s Wilde Consent Judgment.
b. The First Respondent is exploiting the vulnerabilities of the son of the Appellant who is the Second Respondent in these proceedings knowing that the latter has always been his unwilling client by making attempts to exclude the Appellant who was at all material times trying to prevent this exploitation. The Second Judge is reasonably seen to be aiding the Second Respondent’s attempt in this regard.
c. The Second Judge contradicts the intention of the First Judge to allow the Appellant as a litigant in person to represent his son as his McKenzie friend in these proceedings to its finality by unreasonably delimiting that representation only to CIV1903 of 2008 but not to the Caveat Case knowing that the Caveator lawyer has no caveatable interests in the caveat property of the exploited Caveatee, in order to unjustifiably entitle the former to such exclusion of the Appellant.
d. The Second Judge’s refusal to look into the evidence of the non-consensual aspect of the Solicitor Costs Agreement entered into between the Appellant and the First Respondent subject to those pre-contractual terms and the overriding clause of the Appellant’s reservation of his rights to approve all billing/costings already in place; without impinging on the latter’s just entitlements for remuneration as a solicitor sans any champertous arrangements struck between them and giving due regard to the principles of the sanctity of contract, its termination and the ramifications of the parties’ mutual contractual obligations and rights, including the repudiation and acceptance of their fundamental terms.
e. The Second Judge culpable refusal to understand the law with regard to the non-caveatable interests of the First Respondent’s unlawful caveat on the exploited caveatee’s land thus grounding in the liability of the First Respondent in damages under s.140 of the Transfer of Land Act, 1893 (WA) to the exploited caveatee Second Respondent.
f. The Second Judge attempts to find that needle in the haystack which he unreasonably believes is impinging upon the bona fides of the First Respondent’s belief that he had just entitlements to his legal fees which could form the basis of his unreasonable and inexplicable escalation of legal profits costs under circumstances where there are none such evidence available as they form the irrelevant evidence introduced by the First Respondent as red-herrings to confuse the Second Judge as he was wont to do in the courts below with impunity.
g. He refused to take heed of the First Judge’s findings of the ramifications of the Minor Cases Provisions of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act, 2004, which impacts on the improper costs orders of the courts below.
C) CONSOLIDATION
3. In mixed fact and law when he refused to accede to the Appellant’s request for the Appellant’s joinder in the Caveat Case and subsequently for the Caveat Case to be consolidated into the second stage of these proceedings for the purpose of quieting all claims arising from one transaction or event of the Zero Sum debt claim in FR417 of 2007, pursuant to Order 83 of the Rules of Supreme Court, 1971 (WA).
D) MC KENZIE FRIEND
4. In both mixed fact and law in his refusal to acknowledge the fact that the Appellant although a solicitor who has chosen not to renew his practice certificate because he is currently being curbed in his independent practice has the choice to act pro bono for his son without playing the public role of a solicitor and is free from being tainted as having acted in a conflict of interest situation as he has no duties of a court officer to be fair to the First Respondent but the reverse is the case with regard to the responsibilities of the First Respondent vis a vis the Appellant, who is at all material times the client of the First Respondent with regard to the affairs of the Second Respondent.
E) RECUSAL OF SECOND JUDGE
5. In mixed fact and law by virtue of his apprehended bias which is currently the subject of the Appellant’s Application for Mandamus and Prohibitions Orders for the Second Judge to recuse himself from further hearing the second stage of these proceedings filed by the Appellant in CIV 1981 of 2010 on 28.6.2010; the matter is pending hearing by the 4th day of August, 2010 for which the Second Judge had been informed on the 8.7.2010.
E) RE-OPENS THE FLOODGATE OF LITIGATION
6. In mixed fact and law in that he had unjustifiably granted the First Respondent the liberty to apply to vary the First Judge’s Order No.5 given on 7.11.2008 under circumstances when he knew or ought to have known that it would re-open the flood-gates for further litigation of those improper costs orders of the courts below that had been made with jurisdictional errors.


Signed by the Appellant: ………………………………………….
(NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS IN CIV1903 OF 2007 BEFORE JUSTICE KEN MARTIN ON 8TH JULY, 2010

Copyright in this document is reserved to the State of Western Australia. Reproduction of this document (or part thereof, in any format) except with the prior written consent of the attorney-general is prohibited. Please note that under section 43 of the Copyright Act 1968 copyright is not infringed by anything reproduced for the purposes of a judicial proceeding or of a report of a judicial proceeding.
_____

THE SUPREME COURT OF
WESTERN AUSTRALIA

1903 of 2008

NICHOLAS NI KOK CHIN
and
TIMOTHY ROBIN THIES and
PAUL CHUNG KIONG CHIN
KENNETH MARTIN J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT PERTH ON THURSDAY, 8 JULY 2010, AT 9.11 AM
(In Chambers)
Continued from 17/6/10


The plaintiff appeared in person.

MR D.S. ELLIS appeared for the first defendant.







8/7/10 37
(s&c)
THE ASSOCIATE: Supreme Court of Western Australia, general division, CIV 1903 of 2008, Re Michelides ex parte Chin.

KENNETH MARTIN J: Mr Chin, you are in person this morning, and Mr Ellis.

ELLIS, MR: Your Honour.

KENNETH MARTIN J: For the reasons which I now publish in respect of the application of the first defendant for security for costs, I will order that there shall be an award of security for costs in favour of the first defendant in the amount of $20,000 which is to be paid into court at a time not later than 48 hours after the publication of these reasons. At this stage, I will not vary Hasluck J's order 5 of his orders of 7 November 2008 but I grant liberty to the first defendant to apply further in that respect should further events prove it necessary to pursue that application. Gentlemen, those orders are taken from paragraph 42 of my reasons for judgment. Mr Ellis?

ELLIS, MR: Your Honour, a couple of things: firstly, the question of a stay. The summons sought a stay pending compliance with the orders.

KENNETH MARTIN J: Yes. The order will be that unless the $20,000 is paid into court within 48 hours, the action will be stayed.

ELLIS, MR: Thank you, your Honour. The second issue arises out of the orders which your Honour made on 13 May when the matter was before you for directions.

KENNETH MARTIN J: Yes.

ELLIS, MR: You may recall that the fifth order I think was that the first defendant file an outline of the matters which it considered - - -

KENNETH MARTIN J: You would like me to suspend that, given the orders that have been made here.

ELLIS, MR: Yes, your Honour. That's part of it. The suspension part is covered by the order for a stay.

KENNETH MARTIN J: Yes.

ELLIS, MR: The other issue is that Mr Thies is absent from the state for a couple of weeks. I am going away next week as well. What I would seek is an order that effectively we have 14 days, an extra 14 days, or 14 days after the provision of security, whichever occurs sooner. I had drafted a minute of proposed orders which covers that contingency. In light of your reasons, order 3 is not


8/7/10 38
appropriate. The issues dealt with in proposed order 4 - there is an error in the last line of order 4. Order 1 should be order 2.

KENNETH MARTIN J: Yes. I understand the effect of order 4. That seems to me to be appropriate, Mr Ellis.

ELLIS, MR: Thank you, your Honour.

KENNETH MARTIN J: But I will hear Mr Chin about that. Then I suppose there are the costs of the security application in respect of which the first defendant has been successful.

ELLIS, MR: Yes, your Honour.

KENNETH MARTIN J: You would seek those?

ELLIS, MR: Yes, and order 5.

KENNETH MARTIN J: Costs of the application?

ELLIS, MR: Thank you, your Honour.

KENNETH MARTIN J: Very well. Mr Chin, do you wish to be heard?

CHIN, MR: Yes, sir. I have no money to pay and I will not be able to go on with this case. I have made an application for mandamus and certiorari orders in CIV 1981 which is scheduled to be heard on 4 August 2010.

KENNETH MARTIN J: Sorry? CIV 1981 of - - -

CHIN, MR: 2010. If I am not successful - - -

KENNETH MARTIN J: Is that something I know about?

CHIN, MR: Say it again, sir?

KENNETH MARTIN J: Which action is that?

CHIN, MR: It is called CIV 1981 of 2010.

KENNETH MARTIN J: Yes. Have I seen that matter?

CHIN, MR: This is an ex parte application.

KENNETH MARTIN J: I don't know anything about that matter.

CHIN, MR: I have made an application for your recusal, sir, and I have put in the evidence as to why I need the two cases to be consolidated and my son needs to be heard on this matter and that there is to be no security for


8/7/10 39
costs. If I am not successful, I will try and appeal. Sir, as far as security for costs are concerned, I will not be able to comply with it. If I don't have the money, where do I get it, sir? I will just retire. If there is no avenue for me to succeed, I will just retire. There is nothing else that I can do.

KENNETH MARTIN J: Mr Chin, you are re-arguing the security for costs application. I have just published my reasons for decision which you obviously haven't read yet. The question is the orders to be made on that security for costs application. The first order that I propose to make is that that action will be stayed unless you pay $20,000 into court within 48 hours.

CHIN, MR: Yes. I have no money to pay.

KENNETH MARTIN J: That doesn't meet the point.

CHIN, MR: If you want to stay, you stay but we will wait until 4 August and see what happens.

KENNETH MARTIN J: Sorry? Say that again?

CHIN, MR: Until 4 August - until this case is heard. I am asking for mandamus and prohibition orders.

KENNETH MARTIN J: Against who?

CHIN, MR: Against your Honour, sir.

KENNETH MARTIN J: Sorry? Say that again.

CHIN, MR: Against your Honour for recusal.

KENNETH MARTIN J: You're asking for prohibition and certiorari against me?

CHIN, MR: Yes, sir.

KENNETH MARTIN J: That is probably the reason why I haven't seen it. That's a matter for you, Mr Chin, to pursue at your discretion. I obviously shouldn't say anything about that. Do you have anything else to say?

CHIN, MR: Yes. I just want to retire if I cannot get justice.

KENNETH MARTIN J: You want to retire?

CHIN, MR: Retire. I don't want to do anything. I just don't have to pursue anything any more. I don't want to worry myself to death about this matter if there is no justice.



8/7/10 40
KENNETH MARTIN J: We are dealing with the question of orders on my reasons for judgment and the question of costs. Do you have anything relevant to say about that issue?

CHIN, MR: The question of costs in the lower court - there is no cost because those orders are now orders. I have got one point to say: the ex parte record has - that is the common law which decides a section 31 issue, a 36 issue; that is, if the first judge - his Honour Hasluck J - had decided in my favour, it is for the second judge to decide this in my favour as well. If it is not, then there must be justifying circumstances. The justifying circumstance is that the evidence is presented before this court by Mr Thies himself in his two books. The evidence indicates that he admits that there is never any debt of money ever owing to him at all. He admitted that. He is bound by the precontractual agreement he entered into with me. He admitted that my son was never a willing party to the transaction entered with him. He admitted that there is solicitor's cost agreement entered into between him and myself and therefore in all the circumstances - and on many occasions he admitted that he has got no power to charge me and that he must get an authority to charge me and that he has got no authority to continue working for me unless I tell him to continue working. All those things have been admitted. I do not understand why your Honour did not see this point very, very clearly because - - -

KENNETH MARTIN J: Mr Chin, you are arguing with me and I don't intend to hear you arguing.

CHIN, MR: I'm sorry, sir. I'm sorry.

KENNETH MARTIN J: Mr Chin, confine yourself to the issue of orders and costs. Have you got anything to say on the orders and costs? I have given you two opportunities now. You have ignored both. This is your last opportunity.

CHIN, MR: Your Honour, the compromise agreement was entered into involuntarily by Registrar Wild herself. She knew all the time that there was duress being exerted upon her and in order to avoid having the situation aggravated, Registrar Wild delayed in delivering her consent judgment until I importunated her to do so in order to avoid harm to my son. Registrar Wild knew that all the time because I had written communication with her and this evidence is before this court. Because Registrar Wild - a consent judgment is a null consent order because it is made against her own wishes. Therefore, that consent order can never be acted upon. Because it is a null consent order, all the other orders, cost orders, made by Herron C, made by Magistrate Musk and made by Magistrate Michelides - they are all consent orders. They all fall into the same heap, because if there is no basis for such an order in the first


8/7/10 41
place, then everything falls underneath because there is no foundation for the cost orders.

KENNETH MARTIN J: It is the same jurisdictional argument you put to me many times in the past, Mr Chin. I understand it but I don't accept it.

CHIN, MR: Sir, I do not understand your logic, sir.

KENNETH MARTIN J: It's not a question for you to understand me, Mr Chin. It is a question for me to hear the arguments and make a decision and publish my ruling. My ruling has been the subject of the reasons that you have in front of you and the question is the orders to be made. That's all I am concerned with at this point.

CHIN, MR: I have no money to pay Mr Thies.

KENNETH MARTIN J: You have also said that before.

CHIN, MR: So why did you never take into consideration the court costs regarding the money for the case and the legislative intention of parliament when it enacted those monetary provisions?

KENNETH MARTIN J: Mr Chin, it is not for you to interrogate me about what I did or didn't do. Do you understand that? It is for me to interrogate you, not the opposite.

CHIN, MR: Yes.

KENNETH MARTIN J: Very well. I have heard enough from you this morning. You are not addressing the point. Please sit down. The court will make orders in these terms: (1) there will be an order for security for costs in the amount of $20,000 in favour of the first defendant payable by the plaintiff; second, unless the amount of $20,000 is paid into court by the plaintiff within 48 hours, then the plaintiff's action is stayed; third, the plaintiff shall pay the first defendant's costs of the security for costs application of 13 May 2010 to be taxed and, fourth, the time limited by order 5 of my orders made on 13 May 2010 for the provision of a draft statement and a draft agreed chronology of events is extended to a date which is 28 days from today or 14 days after compliance by the plaintiff with order 2 of my orders which is the payment of $20,000 into court, whichever is the latter event. There will be orders 1 to 4 in those terms. Mr Ellis?

ELLIS, MR: Your Honour, my recollection is that the order for payment of securities was order number 1, not order number 2. Order number 2 was about the stay.



8/7/10 42
KENNETH MARTIN J: Yes, quite right. I will renumber order 4 to refer to order 1, the payment of $20,000.

ELLIS, MR: Thank you, your Honour.

KENNETH MARTIN J: Very well. Court will now adjourn and reconstitute as the CMC list.

AT 9.26 AM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED ACCORDINGLY
















































8/7/10 43

Sunday, July 11, 2010

WE DO BUSINESS TOGETHER AND WE GET RID OF AUSTRALIAN RACISM TOGETHER

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Unity Party WA [mailto:unitypartywa@westnet.com.au]
Sent: Sunday, July 11, 2010 7:02 PM
To: Fed Liberal Leader; Prime Minister
Cc: UNHCR - au; UN -Human Rights Complaints; UN News; Senator - Broad.; Senator - Chapman; Senator - Eggleston; Senator - fielding; Senator - Hanson-Young; Senator - Joyce; Senator - Siewert; Senator - Troeth; Senator - Xenophon; Senator B.Greig Greig; Senator.Bob.Brown; Senator-Sherry; Editor - AJAA Just Australia; Editor - Apple Daily; Editor - avaaz; Editor - be; Editor - Bloomberg; Editor - DW Radio; Editor - Egypt Today; Editor - Enquiro; Editor - Fijilive; Editor - Free Press ca; Editor - Globe Mails; Editor - globeandmail.ca; Editor - Guardian; Editor - Gulf Times; Editor - Haaretz; Editor - Het Belang be; Editor - iht.com; Editor - Independant uk; Editor - Independent; Editor - ITV; Editor - NDTV; Editor - New York Times; Editor - Newsweek; Editor - Provda; Editor - Spanish World; Editor - T.S.T Dar; Editor - The Times uk; Editor - TV ba; Editor - TV Be; Editor - TV7 fr; Editor - VOANews; Editor - welt.de; Editor - WJ; Editor - WSJ; Editor - XKB; Editor -bpra.bund.de; Editor -political Comments; Editor-Daily Indep ng; Editor-L'Humanite.fr; Editor-Toronto Star; Fed Defence Minister; Fed Deputy Prime Minister; Fed Foreign Minister; Fed Human Services; Fed Minister - Agricul; Fed Minister - Arts & heritage; Fed Minister - Climate; Fed Minister - Communication; Fed Minister - Finance; Fed Minister - Indigenous; Fed Minister - Multi Affairs; Fed Minister for Health; Fed Minister for Mul; Fed Minister for Trade Trade; Fed Minister- Health; Fed Treasurer; Fed. Attorney General; Fed. Minister -IMMI; Liberal - Attorney General; Liberal - Custom; Liberal - Finance; Liberal - Foreign Affairs; Liberal - IMMI; Liberal - Treasurer; Editor-W.N.Wkly -Qld; Editor - Qld A.B. Wly; Editor - Perthchinese; Editor - Oriental weekly; Editor - Editor - A.B.Weekly; Editor - DCH Mel; Editor - C.M.D Mel; Editor - Aus.Chinese daily; Editor - Aus Daily; Editor - ACNW vic; Editor - A.C.Times; Editor - Migration Times; President - Press club NZ; President - Press Club - india; President - Press cl uk; President - Press Cl ug; President - Press Cl ta; President - Press cl sm; President - Press cl -sg; President - Press cl p-I; President - Press cl ma; President - Press cl lao; President - Press cl in; President - Press Cl id; President - Press cl Ga; President - Press Cl ch; Anglican - Arch; Catholic Church; Paul Murray; Manager-ABC - TV; Manager -SBS - Radio; Manager - TV/7 news; Manager - TV/2 TV; Manager - TV/10 10; Manager - SBS TV; Manager - 6 PR; Editor-West Aust Australian; Editor-Sunday Times Times; Editor-Heraldsun.au; Editor-Daily Telegraph Telegraph; Editor-Courier Mail Mail; Editor-Canberra Times; Editor-Advertiser; Editor- SMH; Editor - WA News; Editor - Today Tonight; Editor - the Australian; Editor - The Age Age; Editor - Sun Herald; Editor - Sky News; Editor - PerthNow; Editor - News Digital; Editor - Jim Marrs; Editor - Herald Sun; Editor - AFR; Tommy Jiang - 3CW; Richard WC Tan; Richard Tan; President - He Tong Huey; President - Fujian Asn; President - FECCA; President - FCMA; President - Chung Wah; President - CAU Pun; President - CAF; President - Bur Asn WA; Presideent - He Nan aSN; Jack Au - Auburn; Chairman - DAP; Lily Chen; Gerry Georgatos; Aboriginal Legal Ser; Craig Collins
Subject: Re: Racism rife; 'Yellow peril' racism rears its ugly head
Importance: High
Dear Prime Minister Gillard and Liberal Leader Abbott,
What are you going to do with racism in Australia?
Eddie Hwang
11-Jul-2010.
----- Original Message -----
From: Unity Party WA
To: Abbott, Tony (MP)
Cc: Senator - Broad. ; Senator - Chapman ; Senator - Eggleston ; Senator - fielding ; Senator - Hanson-Young ; Senator - Joyce ; Senator - Siewert ; Senator - Troeth ; Senator - Xenophon ; Senator B.Greig Greig ; Senator.Bob.Brown ; Senator-Sherry ; Editor-W.N.Wkly -Qld ; Editor - Qld A.B. Wly ; Editor - Oriental weekly ; Editor - Editor - A.B.Weekly ; Editor - DCH Mel ; Editor - C.M.D Mel ; Editor - Aus.Chinese daily ; Editor - Aus Daily ; Editor - ACNW vic ; Editor - A.C.Times ; Editor - Perthchinese ; Liberal - Attorney General ; Liberal - Custom ; Liberal - Finance ; Liberal - Foreign Affairs ; Liberal - IMMI ; Liberal - Treasurer ; Tommy Jiang - 3CW ; Richard WC Tan ; Richard Tan ; President - He Tong Huey ; President - Fujian Asn ; President - FECCA ; President - FCMA ; President - Chung Wah ; President - CAU Pun ; President - CAF ; President - Bur Asn WA ; President - Bahai ; Presideent - He Nan aSN ; Jack Au - Auburn ; Chairman - DAP ; Lily Chen
Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 2010 9:55 AM
Subject: Re: Thank you for your email to the Leader of the Opposition, the Hon Tony Abbott MP
Dear Mr. Abbott,
When are you going to answer our question below as we will be targeting those marginal seats nationwide.
Eddie Hwang
07-7-2010.
Sent: Saturday, April 24, 2010 4:13 PM
Subject: Re: Thank you for your email to the Leader of the Opposition, the Hon Tony Abbott MP
Dear Mr. Abbott,
If we Asian-Australian community wants to vote for you, would you be prepared to get rid of the White Australia Policy - lock , stock and barrel?
We will be asking you the same question until the election.
We have emailed this message to a large number of Asian-Australians under BCC.
Looking forward to hear from you in due course.
Eddie Hwang
24-Apr-2010.
----- Original Message -----
From: Abbott, Tony (MP)
To: unitypartywa@westnet.com.au
Sent: Monday, July 05, 2010 10:45 AM
Subject: Thank you for your email to the Leader of the Opposition, the Hon Tony Abbott MP
Thank you for your email to the Leader of the Opposition, the Hon Tony Abbott MP.
Your views will be brought to Mr Abbott’s attention.
It is vital that the Coalition knows what people are thinking so that we can represent the interests of all Australians, and present people with a credible and inspiring alternative at the next election.
Thank you again for taking the time to pass on your thoughts.
Racism rife
July 4, 2010
THE Human Rights Commission has stepped up efforts to stamp out racism in Australian schools after finding that seven out of 10 people aged 12 to 19 had experienced it, either as a victim, a witness or as a perpetrator.
Race Discrimination Commissioner Graeme Innes told a conference in Melbourne that racism remained a serious problem in Australian schools, warning that racist jokes, offensive name calling and cultural stereotyping were widespread.
Aussie Land: a redneck nation of Chinese-haters
Not just Australia. Her allies as well, and that includes the Americans and English.
These very same uneducationable, ignorant rednecks come to Singapore with their cheap degrees and exaggerated experience and qualifications, and are glorified as “foreign talent” (sic) and of a superior breed relegating the local populace to being that of a lesser race.
‘Yellow peril’ racism rears its ugly head
MARILYN LAKE - April 3, 2010 - Age
Chinese were once vilified in Australia, a travesty we’d do well not to repeat.
----- Original Message -----
From: Abbott, Tony (MP)
To: unitypartywa@westnet.com.au
Sent: Monday, July 05, 2010 10:45 AM
Subject: Thank you for your email to the Leader of the Opposition, the Hon Tony Abbott MP
Thank you for your email to the Leader of the Opposition, the Hon Tony Abbott MP.
Your views will be brought to Mr Abbott’s attention.
It is vital that the Coalition knows what people are thinking so that we can represent the interests of all Australians, and present people with a credible and inspiring alternative at the next election.
Thank you again for taking the time to pass on your thoughts.

WE WANT A BETTER AUSTRALIA WITHOUT RACISM AND IT IS FOR ALL

From: Unity Party WA [mailto:unitypartywa@westnet.com.au]
Sent: Sunday, July 11, 2010 4:09 PM
To: Hong Lim MP
Cc: Ambassador - PRC; Tommy Jiang - 3CW; Richard WC Tan; Richard Tan; President - He Tong Huey; President - Fujian Asn; President - FECCA; President - FCMA; President - Chung Wah; President - CAU Pun; President - CAF; President - Bur Asn WA; Presideent - He Nan aSN; Jack Au - Auburn; Chairman - DAP; Lily Chen; Chinese Consul - Perth; Chinese Consulate - Mel; Chinese Consulate - Syd; Editor-W.N.Wkly -Qld; Editor - Qld A.B. Wly; Editor - Perthchinese; Editor - Oriental weekly; Editor - Editor - A.B.Weekly; Editor - DCH Mel; Editor - C.M.D Mel; Editor - Aus.Chinese daily; Editor - Aus Daily; Editor - ACNW vic; Editor - A.C.Times; Editor - Migration Times
Subject: Fw: Fw: A Chinese Australian stands tall in the Australian political moonscape
Well said, Hong.
Am not a writer of any sort but can assist in spreading the message, if require.
Eddie
----- Original Message -----
From: hong.lim@parliament.vic.gov.au
To: Chek Ling
Cc: Unity Party WA ; cccavic@gmail.com ; tonypun@hotmail.com ; anthonypun@optusnet.com.au ; Stanley Chiang ; Wesa Chau
Sent: Monday, July 12, 2010 12:32 AM
Subject: Re: Fw: A Chinese Australian stands tall in the Australian political moonscape
My Dear Chek,
Of all the accolades and well wishes that have been flooding in during the past couple of days, yours is the most welcome and highly regarded. I accepted it as a badge of honour, especially coming from you - one of the most truly respected Chinese elders, opinion makers, opinion leaders and thinkers.
You would probably realize by now that many of your contemporary and the younger generation of our community, who do really care about making a difference and doing the real, and the right things for the Chinese community in this country, are hanging on to your every word of wisdom every time you care to come out to make some pronouncements or prognosis about our community. Because we know you truly care as you do not have hidden agendas and you are without fear or favour. You truly set the standard and I believe many of us live in fear of failing you - hence failing our community and ourselves - (yet I have not even met you!). There are not enough like you in our Chinese community.
People like you, and Eddie in WA, reminds me constantly of a Richard Briggs, a Kiwi man (half Maori and half English) who spent all his energy, time and financial resources to assist the Indo- Chinese refugees during the late 1970's and 80's, although he was not well-off by any standard. He had a BA(Hons.) but chose to work in the mines of WA because that way he earned more money and had the flexibility of travelling to help the survivors of Pol Pot/Khmer Rouge's Killing Fields in the refugee camps at the Cambodia -Thailand border, which included tens of thousands of ethnic Chinese like my family. He wrote, printed and distributed the book about the suffering of the refugees and challenged the world community to come to the aid of this genocide survivors. He came to stay at my home one night (I lost track of him since then) and I asked him why he did what he did, and I will never forget his response: "Hong, what does a man need? All we need is a bed and a meal!".
Just imagine if only we have enough people in our Chinese community thinking and acting like him, there would be so much we can achieve as a community in this country, in the world; especially with the brain and resources we can muster for the common goal/good. With a dedicated group of people like him we can stand and walk tall and we would be in the position to dictate the terms of engagement, with the power to be, like other more established communities in Australia. The problem, as you keep reminding us, there are far too many who only care about their next Mercedes and when they are going to have their photo taken with Hu Jintao or the PM of Australia, just to promote their respective commercial interests - yet we rate nothing in the mind and eyes of the power to be, as compared to the Jewish, Greek, Italian........ because we are not organized, not mobilized, hence not credible and respected, thus never consulted or listen to....... And instead of progressing to a more deserved and mutually respected level of engagement with the power to be, we are now being dragged down and distracted by the miserable and disgraceful affairs in Sydney (and also in Melbourne) that now consume and waste intellectual energy and time of our leaders like Tony Pun, as he has to mob up the spills and pick up the pieces. (As a community we might need to push for a nationwide review of all the funding allocated to the myriad Chinese organizations in Australia to ensure if they are up to the expected KPI (Key Performing Indicators), let alone their CBA (Cost Benefit Analysis) in relations to our community's changing dynamic and needs. May be we should discuss all these as part of a national conference, which need to be soon - now that you are prepared to come down south to share your wisdom!. There are so much we need to work on - a vision/plan/mission for our growing community for the next 10-15-20 years......to take our proper place in this, our, country....with Chinese judges...in the Supreme court...more Councillors, ...MPs.... Premiers/PM.... Governors.... heading the police, armed forces, VCs of Uni....and more ..why not!?)
Never-the-less, I believe there are enough people/leaders amongst our community and business sectors who are conscious about our failing and are very keen to play their part to assist in this quest to make a difference. I believe that if we work together with an open heart and transparent agenda and do the real and right things we would achieve our common deserved ambitions. I hope like many other good and real Chinese community leaders you share this dream.
Indeed Check, I am most honoured and encouraged by your endorsement. I hope, now that we are on the same wavelength, together with other like mind and concern we could make a difference.
Most sincere regards,
Hong Lim, MP
Member for Clayton
Special Advisor to the Premier
on Victoria-Asia Business Relations
PS: I take the liberty of broadcast this message to as many leaders of our community as possible and hope to hear their response to this our common concern.
From: "Chek Ling"
To: "Hong Lim"
Date: 09/07/2010 10:21 AM
Subject: Fw: A Chinese Australian stands tall in the Australian political moonscape
________________________________________
Dear Hong
My admiration for your free spirit and great principle.
What a splendid example.
I hope you don't mind what I have done with this wonderful news.
If I have misrepresented you, I am sorry, and please let me know.
All best.
Chek
From: Chek Ling
Sent: Friday, July 09, 2010 10:07 AM
To: huarenlist@yahoogroups.com
Cc: Graham Perrett ; Michael Choi ; Andrew Jakubowicz
Subject: A Chinese Australian stands tall in the Australian political moonscape
Dear all
I thought I'd share my elation of seeing a Chinese Australian in public life, standing up for his principles, and not winning himself any brownie points from his own political Party.
Hong Lim laments Julia Gillard's spoutings on boat people. That is a brave thing to do, in print no less, given the dire circumstances under which Julia Gillard became PM just a week or two previously. You can read the article at: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/mp-hong-lim-slams-gillard-asylum-solution/story-e6frg6nf-1225889566827
Is this a milestone in public life for C-As? Is this a proud legacy we can unequivocally bequeath to our heirs? (Away from the three monkeys approach to public life, or the obsequious middleman mentality of self-enrichment at the cost of degrading the Chinese-Australian brand.)
This seems to me to be an opportune time for one of the "peak Chinese community" organisations to come out and host a function to celebrate this milestone. There is at least one such state and one such national organisation in Hong Lim's home state of Victoria. Could have a guest speaker, say Julian Burnside, the well-known (barrister)activist for the humane treatment of boat people. No doubt it might just as well be, instead, for Hong Lim to talk about his approach to public life.
Would someone in Victoria please pass on my pleading to the pertinent leaders of those peak organisations in Victoria please?
I promise I will fly down to attend. For me it would be close to an "historic" occasion in the annals of Chinese Australian affairs.
Ever the optimist,
Chek
Brisbane, Australia