Wednesday, April 26, 2017
Appeals from VCAT on the basis of Inadequate reasons Posted: 18 Apr 2017 07:40 PM PDT A while ago, my client settled an appeal to the Supreme Court from a decision of VCAT. I set out below extracts from my (sadly wasted) submissions in relation to the applicable law, so you will not have to reinvent the wheel should you suffer the misfortune of losing in an inadequately reasoned decision. A failure to give reasons is an error of law. By way of example of the application of this principle, the Commissioner recently succeeded on this basis in a s. 148 inadequacy of reasons appeal against a decision of VCAT in LSC v Turner  VSC 394 (esp. at  et seq, ). Seriously inadequate reasons are corrosive of public confidence in the administration of justice and ought not to be tolerated by an appeal court, since justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. This is the first public policy informing the requirement for reasons by courts and court-like tribunals. As the Supreme Court has observed: ‘To have a strong body of evidence put aside without explanation is likely to give rise to a feeling of injustice in the mind of the most reasonable litigant.’ That is especially so in relation to factual determinations where a right of appeal lies only on a question of law. Even more especially so in a quasi-criminal prosecution with serious consequences for the practitioner in which the Commissioner carries the burden of proof as described in Briginshaw v Briginshaw. The second public policy which requires adequate reasons is facilitation of the exercise of a right to appeal (or to apply for leave). Where the path of reasoning is unstated or difficult follow it is difficult to attack on its merits, because it is unclear what the merits of the reasoning are, whether relevant considerations were ignored and whether irrelevant considerations were taken into account. Section 117 of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 requires the Tribunal to give reasons for any order it makes in a proceeding other than interim orders. Where there is a conflict on the evidence, and one version is accepted and the other rejected, the judge must avert to and assign reasons for that rejection: ACN 087 528 774 Pty Ltd v Chetcuti (2008) 21 VR 559, 566 at  per Hargreave AJA with whom Ashley and Dodds-Streeton JJA agreed. Mere recitation of evidence followed by a statement of findings is insufficient to disclose a path of reasoning; indeed, it is ‘about as good as useless’: Hunter v TAC (2005) 43 MVR 143 , . This is specifically so in relation to s. 117 according to Justice Kyrou, speaking extra-judicially. In that address, his Honour said: ‘In a nutshell, adequate reasons are reasons that clearly set out the factual and legal issues for determination, the conclusions on those issues and the thought process that has been applied in reaching those conclusions.’ ‘VCAT’s reasons must be intelligible. Reasons are not intelligible if they leave the reader to wonder about the process of reasoning that has been followed’. Where evidence which is not inherently improbable and is uncontradicted is not accepted, decision makers are required to give reasons for non-acceptance: Hardy v Gillette  VR 392, 395-6. Decisions of VCAT have been set aside for a failure to give adequate reasons, notwithstanding the High Court’s caution against over zealous scrutiny of administrative decision makers in Minister for Immigration v Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 and like admonitions. That caution must apply less forcefully to appeals from VCAT in common law misconduct prosecutions seeking suspension of a solicitor from practice than in a small claim or a planning question in the Tribunal. The proposition that the standard of reasons required of decision makers ‘can vary markedly with the context’ cuts both ways: where a tribunal is called upon to determine a quasi-criminal prosecution, seeking interference with a sole lawyer director’s entitlement to practise, it must rise to the occasion. There is no reason why VCAT’s decisions in such a case, in which transcript is called for and written submissions ordered, and costs ordered against County Court scale should be of any lesser standard than those of a County Court judge, especially in light of the express obligation provided by s. 117. The trend seems to be to require better reasons from VCAT more generally than might have been demanded in the first half of the last century: Caruso v Kite  VSC 207 at  (Kyrou J). In professional conduct prosecutions in which findings of dishonesty are to be made, it is obviously important for reasons to make clear and careful findings about the state of mind of the allegedly dishonest person.  Secretary to the Department of Treasury and Finance v Dalla-Riva (2007) 26 VAR 96, 102 at  per Buchanan JA with whom Ashley JA and Smith AJA agreed; Victoria v Turner  VSC 66 -; Paul & Paul Pty Ltd v Business Licensing Authority  VSC 460 (15 October 2010) -; E Kyrou, ‘Adequacy of Reasons’  VicJSchol 24; Secretary to the Department of Justice v Yee  VSC 447 at  (Kyrou J).  Sun Alliance Insurance Ltd v Massoud  VR 8, 18 (Gray J, with whom Fullager and Tadgell JJ agreed), re-stated by Rush J in Sun Alliance in Gray v Brimbank City Council  VSC 13.  See Stirling v LSC  VSCA 374 at  et seq.  They referred to Hunter v TAC  VSCA 1 -, Franklin v Ubaldi Foods Pty Ltd  VSCA 317 and Sun Alliance Ltd v Massoud  VR 18-19. The first and third decisions were followed in a s. 148 appeal from VCAT by Rush J in Gray v Brimbank City Council  VSC 13 at  (referring to  in Hunter) and . Hunter was approved in Franklin was followed in Pham v Legal Services Commissioner  VSC 671 (Bell J), another s. 148 appeal and on appeal by Redlich and Kaye JJA: Pham v Legal Services Commissioner  VSCA 256 at . Consider also Ta v Thompson  VSCA 344 at .  ‘Adequacy of Reasons’  VicJSchol 24.  Secretary to the Department of Justice v Yee  VSC 447 (Kyrou J), citing Commissioner of State Revenue v Anderson (2004) 24 VAR 181, 191  and other authorities; LSC v Turner  VSC 394 at .  Quinn v LIV (2007) VAR 1 esp at  et seq, , ; Burgess v McGarvie  VSCA 142 at  et seq.; LSC v Turner  VSC 394 at  et seq.  Wingfoot Australia Partners Pty Ltd v Kocak (2013) 252 CLR 480, 498 .  See also the following authorities which usefully summarise the NSW authorities: Pollard v RRR Corporation Pty Ltd  NSWCA 110 at , Palmer v Clarke (1989) 19 NSWLR 158 at 170 (Kirby P); Qushair v Raffoul  NSWCA 110 at , followed in Kalloghlian v Chubb Insurance Company of Australia Ltd  NSWSC 902.  Consider Giudice v Legal Profession Complaints Committee  WASCA 115 at , - and LSC v Brereton (2011) 33 VR 126 at  per Tate JA with whom the other judges agreed.
Wednesday, April 8, 2015
Sunday, March 22, 2015
Saturday, March 14, 2015
MY APPLICATION TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE MAGISTRATES COURT AT FREMANTLE THAT IT MUST REMOVE THE FREMANTLE/MINOR/944/2007 FROM THE INACTIVE LIST ON THE GROUND OF EQUITABLE FRAUD
Thursday, March 12, 2015
NAVIGATORS OR NON-LAWYER ADVOCATES: PEOPLE WITHOUT LAW DEGREES CONTRIBUTING TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN NEW YORK AND HERE YOU HAVE THE UGLY FACE OF LEGAL CORRUPTION DOING THE WRONG THING TO MEMBERS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
Friday, February 13, 2015
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2015/02/13/parts-of-ottawa-terror-and-money-laundering-law-rules-unconstitutional.html CANADA The Supreme Court of Canada ruled Friday on a long-running dispute lawyers had with Ottawa terror and money-laundering law. SEAN KILPATRICK / THE CANADIAN PRESS The Supreme Court of Canada ruled Friday on a long-running dispute lawyers had with Ottawa terror and money-laundering law. By: Tonda MacCharles Ottawa Bureau reporter, Published on Fri Feb 13 2015 OTTAWA—The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled a federal anti-money laundering law that forces lawyers to identify sources of their clients’ cash and allows federal investigators to conduct warrantless searches of law firms is unconstitutional. In a ruling Friday, the high court settled a 15-year-long dispute between Canada’s legal profession and the federal government. The effect of the decision is to exempt lawyers, notaries and law offices from the law’s record-keeping, client-identification and disclosure obligations. But the law still applies to other financial institutions, banks and accounting firms who must track their clients’ money trails and may be subjected to warrantless searches by government authorities. The Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act was passed by the former Liberal government in 2000, part of an international movement to crack down on terrorist financing. It required lawyers to identify and verify the source of any money in transactions over $3,000 that they handled on behalf of clients, to keep records for five years and produce them on demand. It empowered Ottawa’s financial intelligence agency, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada — the body that tracks financing of terrorist activity and organized crime — to enter law offices, demand documents, and make copies of information in files or on computers. Lawyers who failed to comply were exposed to fines up to $500,000 or jail terms up to five years. The Federation of Law Societies launched a constitutional challenge of the law in 2001 on behalf of the 14 self-governing bodies that oversee Canada’s lawyers, arguing it was an attempt to turn lawyers into “agents of the state” and their law firms into “archives for the police and prosecution.” On Friday, the high court agreed. It found the law breached lawyers’ Charter protections against unreasonable search and seizure, as well as the constitutional right not to be unduly deprived of liberty, and could not be justified. All seven high court judges agreed with the federation that the law breached solicitor-client privilege, however, a majority of five judges went further than that. They enshrined a new privilege — known as the “duty of a lawyer to a client’s cause” — in the Constitution, calling it a basic principle of fundamental justice. It strengthens the guarantee of life, liberty and security of the person. While Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin and Michael Moldaver agreed with the majority on the outcome, they stopped short of embracing any new constitutional principle of a lawyer’s “duty of commitment to a client’s cause,” saying that the privileged protection of solicitor-client communications — already a constitutional principle — was enough. The end result is a victory for the 14 self-regulating law societies across Canada who moved to bring in their own tough rules governing law practices. Tom Conway, president of the Federation of Law Societies which led the challenge, said those rules already ensure lawyers aren’t “dupes” of money-launderers or terrorists. Justice Thomas Cromwell, writing for the majority, pointed to those rules of legal practice and ethical standards that ensure lawyers will not “unknowingly assist in or turn a blind eye to money laundering or terrorism financing.” Conway said the ruling means that clients and the Canadian public “can have confidence that that information they impart to their lawyer will not be accessible to the state in pursuit of criminal sanctions.” Conway said the federation had won injunctions against the application of the law against the country’s litigators and advocates while litigation and discussions with government were underway. But when consultations failed to reach a consensus, the litigation was revived about five years ago. “We’re delighted,” said Fred Headon, past president of the Canadian Bar Association. “Courts often speak of our Constitution as a living tree, and I think today it sprouted a new branch.” Headon said the ruling “recognizes an important element of (how) our democracy functions. Canadians need to have confidence in that system or else they won’t avail themselves of it.” “The duty of commitment to the client’s cause is not only concerned with justice for individual clients but is also deemed essential to maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice,” the ruling said. That duty ensures that “divided loyalty does not cause the lawyer to ‘soft peddle’ his or her (representation)” and prevents the solicitor-client relationship from being undermined, Cromwell added. The Conservative government said little Friday, other than that it would take time to review the decision, according to Nicholas Bergamini, spokesman for Finance Minister Joe Oliver.